Explanatory note
General policy statement
The purpose of this Bill is to introduce a number of parliamentary reforms in order to enhance the government formation process and recognise the multi-party nature of Parliament.
New Zealand's current constitutional framework is not ideally suited to a proportional electoral system and the multi-party Parliament which results. Many countries with proportional representation have instituted a number of arrangements designed to enhance political stability and Government durability. This Bill sets out to legislate for three such arrangements, focussing on the processes of forming and terminating governments.
The first key provision in the Bill addresses the length of time that can elapse between holding of a general election and the summoning of Parliament. Section 19 of the Constitution Act 1986 requires Parliament to meet "not later than six weeks after the day fixed for the return of the writs for that election". Since the return of the writs usually takes just under two weeks, the Parliament is legally obliged, in effect, to meet within eight weeks of a general election. This is at least twice as long as the timetable allowed in many other parliamentary democracies.
The length of time between the 1996 general election and the formation of the Government just prior to Christmas that year was widely regarded as excessive. Once the composition of a new Parliament has been officially determined its members should have the opportunity to meet as soon as is practicable. Only in this way can the will of the electorate, through its newly elected representatives, be given proper expression, and only in this way can the business of the House and its committees be officially resumed.
This Bill requires Parliament to meet within 30 days of an election. Reducing the time permitted between an election and the mandatory calling of Parliament is also likely to speed up the process of government formation, thereby shortening the duration of a caretaker government.
The second key provision in this Bill is the introduction of an investiture vote at the first sitting of Parliament following the election of the Speaker. It is appropriate in a multi-party democracy where governments are often both coalitions and minorities to ensure that any new government has the confidence of Parliament at the outset. This Bill sets out a procedure whereby a party or parties become the Government providing a simple majority of members support it. An investiture vote is also held if the person holding the office of Prime Minister, for whatever reason, ceases to do so.
The third key provision is a requirement for a no confidence motion to be won by an absolute majority of all members in order to force the Government's resignation. Known as a constructive vote of no confidence, the motion would have 2 components, an expression of no confidence in the current government together with a proposal for an alternative Government. This in effect puts the onus on a party challenging the confidence of the Government to demonstrate that it instead has the confidence of an absolute majority of the parliament to form an alternative government. This measure may reduce the likelihood of early elections, leading to greater stability in the electoral cycle.
Together these three provisions would enhance the public standing of our MMP electoral system because they improve the workings of Parliament.
Clause by clause analysis
Clause 1 is the Title clause.
Clause 2 is the commencement clause, providing that the provisions come into force on 1 January 2002.
Clause 3 sets out the purpose of the Act.
Clause 4 amends section 19 of the principal Act by shortening the time, from 6 to 2 weeks, by which Parliament must meet after the return of the writs following a general election.
Clause 5 inserts into the principal Act new sections relating to the formation and resignation of Governments.
New section 20A provides for an investiture vote by the House of Representatives at the beginning of a Parliament or if the incumbent Prime Minister ceases to be so to ensure that the Government enjoys the confidence of the House. This vote is carried by a simple majority of affirmative votes.
New section 20B requires that votes of no confidence are constructive, i.e. the motion must include an alternative nominee for Prime Minister. The vote is only carried by an absolute majority of affirmative votes of all members.
Rod Donald
Constitution (Confidence Votes) Amendment Bill
Member's Bill
Contents
The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows:
1Title
(1)This Act is the Constitution (Confidence Votes) Amendment Act 2001.
(2)In this Act, the Constitution Act 1986 is called "the principal Act".
2Commencement
This Act comes into force on 1 January 2002.
3Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to amend the Constitution Act 1986 to better recognise, with New Zealand's adoption of a proportional system of electoral representation, the relationship that exists between the House of Representatives and a Government and, in particular, to —
(a)establish procedures that are more transparent and certain in relation to the formation and resignation of Governments:
(b)make other amendments.
4First meeting of Parliament after general election
Section 19 of the principal Act is amended by omitting the expression "6", and substituting the expression "2".
5New heading and sections inserted
The principal Act is amended by inserting, after section 20, the following heading and sections:
"Formation and resignation of Governments
"20AInvestiture vote
"(1)The House of Representatives (the House), by resolution, must endorse a member of the House of Representatives (a member) as having its confidence, for the purpose of facilitating the formation of a Government or, as the case may be, confirming a Government in office.
"(2)The procedure specified in subsection (1) takes place on the first day on which the House meets following, —
"(a)at the beginning of a Parliament, the confirmation by the Governor-General of a member as Speaker of the House of Representatives pursuant to section 12; or
"(b)a person ceasing to hold office as Prime Minister.
"(3)A member proposes himself or herself to the House for endorsement.
"(4)A member is endorsed if he or she obtains a simple majority of affirmative votes.
"20BConstructive vote of no confidence
"The House of Representatives may not pass a resolution that expresses no confidence in the Prime Minister unless that resolution —
"(a)proposes that the House endorse a member (other than the member holding office as Prime Minister) as having the confidence of the House; and
"(b)is carried by affirmative votes cast by an absolute majority of all members."
