Is Emissions Trading the way to go?
The Green Party has never believed a full emissions trading scheme is a sensible way for New Zealand to go at this stage. We believe it will get bogged down in the politics of allocation and is hugely complex to administer and so won't have much effect on our emissions in the first Kyoto period. Our policy since 1993 was a carbon charge, recycled as income tax reductions on the bottom band of everyone's income.
Economists are increasingly agreeing with us. However from the end of 2005 it was clear that neither Labour nor National would contemplate a carbon charge. That led us to put out our alternative system in March, which was very well received. It proposed that only the large companies who bring fossil fuels into the economy should be required to engage with the trading market, and remit to government enough carbon credits to cover our liability under Kyoto in 2012, which otherwise will be worn by taxpayers. This would have been felt across the economy as a price on carbon, without the complex and fraught allocation process envisaged now. It would have generated revenue for government, rather than for speculators, to invest in helping people reduce emissions and adapt to higher energy prices.
However, the government seems to be embarking on a full scale "cap and trade" emissions trading framework so we have put these notes together to help media and the public judge the effectiveness of the policy when it comes out. We have not seen the Government's proposals.
They need to be judged on the twin principles of effectiveness for the climate, and fairness for all New Zealanders.
Trading carbon credits does nothing to reduce emissions. It is just a way to ensure that the reductions are made at least cost. The key to reducing emissions is the total allowable emissions, or cap which determines how many units there are to trade, and therefore how much they cost.
New Zealand is already part of a cap and trade system internationally — it is called the Kyoto protocol and it sets our cap at the level of emissions we had in 1990. If we set a different cap from this, perhaps to try to keep the price down here, firms in New Zealand will not be able to engage with the international market and our units will not be Kyoto compliant. I refer to NZ carbon units as "NZ monopoly money" as they will not be recognized under Kyoto. A higher cap — ie more units to trade — will lead to less carbon reduction, bad for the climate and bad for the taxpayer in 2012.
Other important questions are whether the cap will leak — how will emissions be verified and registered so there is no double counting? For example, if a wind farm sells credits to a coal burning plant so it can burn more coal, the wind farm can no longer claim to be carbon-neutral.
This is the key "fairness" question. The price of energy, particularly fuel, will go up - there is no other way to put a price on carbon and encourage the changes we need. The issue is, who gets that money?
In the Greens' proposal it would have all gone into a ring fenced fund to be spent on helping people adapt to higher prices by reducing their emissions. It would have provided alternatives like much better public transport and incentives for investment in wood fuel instead of coal in industry. It could have insulated all our old houses.
Just as people speculate in the currency market they will speculate in what they think the price of carbon is going to be. This puts some of the money in totally unproductive pockets. If more carbon permits are allocated to firms than they really need they will keep the value of this. Depending on how the units are allocated, there could be a huge wealth transfer from one section of society to another.
Above all, business wants certainty. They have told me they are more concerned about policy certainty than price certainty. Business will mainly want to know: