The Green Party notes with considerable sadness the resignation of Justice Bill Wilson. Justice Wilson had built a brilliant reputation in the course of his legal career. It is a personal tragedy that an unexpected event of this nature should put to such an abrupt end the work of such a talented individual. We wish him well on a personal level. We trust that Bill Wilson still has a major contribution to make to New Zealand.
The Green Party had no doubt that it is proper for this Parliament to debate standards and conduct affecting the judiciary, just as it is in order for the courts to scrutinise the legality of the actions of members of Parliament and the executive, as my colleague the Hon David Parker pointed out in his request.
What we are doing here is debating the conduct of the executive and the principles by which the judiciary functions in our society. The Acting Attorney-General herself has described this case as "an unprecedented situation in New Zealand's legal history." I advance no judgment on the conduct of the executive at this stage—the Attorney-General, or the Acting Attorney-General, whom, I gather, took over in mid April. I prefer to focus on the broader implications for the judiciary of this particular episode. That is why it is critically important for this House to debate matters of constitutional significance, such as this.
That said, we need to be circumspect in what we say and we should maintain the due deference this House pays to the judiciary.
The circumstances that led to Mr Wilson's resignation are complex. They do not warrant detailed investigation here in this debate. Suffice it to say that it exposes a number of characteristics of the judiciary in a small country such as New Zealand—and perhaps in countries that are not so small—and the rather intimate circle of acquaintances that go to make up the higher echelons of the judiciary.
In such circumstances there exists an even greater than usual responsibility on the part of all individuals involved to ensure that the integrity of the system is not in any way compromised. That is achieved through a strict respect for the principles of openness and transparency.
It is a time-honoured principle of Western democracy that public servants of every kind must be beyond reproach. Public confidence in the standards of behaviour and conduct observed by leading servants of the people is a cornerstone of social harmony and political stability. The threshold of confidence should ideally be enshrined in constitutional and legislative form. Little scope should be available for individual discretion or subjective perception.
The principle of transparency in this respect pertains in particular to issues of financial interest. Nothing undermines public confidence in a nation's institutions and procedures more than suspicion that a public servant may have, or especially proof that one has, suffered a conflict of interest arising from a financial interest in a particular dealing in which he or she was professionally involved.
In New Zealand, members of the executive have been required under statute since 1990 to provide statements of pecuniary interests pertaining to their personal financial affairs. Such statements are submitted to the Speaker, and these are made available for public consumption. In 2006 this practice was extended to all members of Parliament. Since then members of Parliament have been required to submit annual statements of pecuniary interests to a registrar, who makes the information publicly available.
The legislature's version of pecuniary interest statements was modelled along the lines of that of the executive. In both cases careful balance has been struck between transparent public knowledge of an individual's financial affairs and the preservation of personal privacy. The correct balance in this respect appears to have been achieved over the years. The public interest in such annual statements is significant without appearing prurient, and few complaints have been voiced by those on whom the obligations are placed such as ourselves.
There seems to be a general acceptance that such exercises are in the public interest and are neither unduly onerous nor revealing. No such practice, however, has been observed in the case of the judiciary. This recent development within New Zealand's judicial conduct processes suggests to me that application of the same practice observed by the other two branches of Government might assist in the protection of the judiciary in the future.
Being obliged under law to declare pecuniary interests that might be relevant to the conduct of a future case in which one is involved would relieve a judge from a repetitive weight of responsibility to make discretionary judgments about his or her personal affairs as each case arises. Having declared one's pecuniary interests once in a generic manner, independent of any particular trial, a judge may freely proceed in the knowledge that if he or she is appointed to adjudicate public confidence for participation will have already been met.
Yet care has to be exercised to ensure that the final decision is left to the individual judge whether to accept a case. There should be no intention of external interference into the self-regulation of the judiciary by the judiciary. This is the reasoning behind the draft legislation I developed some months ago as a members' bill, which has been in the ballot since August.
The Register of Pecuniary Interests of Judges Bill has as its purpose the promotion of due administration of justice. It requires judges to make returns of pecuniary interests, to provide greater transparency within the judicial system, and to avoid any conflict of interest in the judicial role. The bill would require returns of pecuniary interests from judges and would establish a register of such returns. It would impose a duty on all judges to make an initial return immediately upon being first appointed and on an annual basis thereafter.
Information pertaining to relationship property settlements and debts owed to certain family members would not need to be disclosed nor would short-term debts for supply of goods and services. The actual value amount or extent of any relevant matter under the bill would not be required to be disclosed.
My bill is not designed to imply any right of the legislature to intervene in the affairs of the judiciary. Nothing in the bill would be interpreted as compromising the constitutional principle of judicial independence guaranteed by the Constitution Act 1986 and as respected by constitutional convention. There is a clause to that effect in my bill. The intention of my bill is simply to facilitate the promotion of due administration of justice by requiring a similar financial return by judges as is already required by both the legislature and the executive of this country.
If this sad occurrence of Bill Wilson's resignation results in such a development, something positive will have been gained from this whole episode.
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